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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper outlines a putative pathway for experimental psychopathology 
research developing psychological models of clinical disorders. The pathway uses 
established external validity criteria to define the pathway and clarifies the important 
role that research conducted on healthy participants can play in our understanding of 
clinical disorders.  Defining a research pathway for experimental psychopathology in 
this way has a number of benefits It would (1) make explicit the need to address the 
external validity of developed models, (2) provide a clear set of criteria that would be 
required to extend research on healthy individuals to diagnostic populations, and (3) 
recommend using general psychological knowledge when developing models of 
psychopathology. 
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Introduction 
 
In its broadest sense experimental psychopathology is the study of 
psychopathology processes under highly controlled conditions for the purpose of 
developing detailed models of how psychopathology is acquired and can be treated. 
This research is often carried out on nonhuman animals or on healthy human 
participants in order to create models of psychopathology that mimic or predict the 
processes found in individuals diagnosed with mental health problems (e.g. Abramson 
& Seligman, 1977; Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993). There is no doubt that 
experimental psychopathology as a research approach has made significant 
contributions to understanding psychopathology across many domains, including 
depression and anxiety (Vervliet & Raes, 2013; Steimer, 2011), schizophrenia (Jones, 
Watson & Fone, 2011), neuropsychiatric disorders (Nestler & Hyman, 2010), 
substance abuse and addiction (Lynch, Nicholson, Dance, Morgan & Foley, 2010), 
and pharmacological treatments of psychological disorders (van Gestel, Kostrzewa, 
Adan & Janhunen, 2014) to name just a few. 
This article will focus on some specific, and perhaps neglected issues in 
experimental psychopathology that relate most significantly to the development of 
psychological models of psychopathology. A full understanding of the processes that 
contribute to mental health problems will require the development of both biological 
and psychological models of a disorder, and these different explanatory paradigms 
will complement each other in many ways. For example, both paradigms will reveal 
details of processes that will need to be accounted for in the models developed in the 
other paradigm. In addition, the importance of psychological models should not be 
underestimated, given that such approaches offer a broader perspective than 
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biological models by providing a means of integrating cognitive, behavioural and 
social factors into unified models of aetiology and intervention (Davey, 2015). 
However, the elaboration of psychological models of psychopathology has 
often developed chaotically rather than via an accepted and validated research 
pathway (Davey, 2003). First, clinical psychology research is frequently driven by 
clinical experience and the practitioner’s need to develop more effective and efficient 
interventions (Dawes, 1994). As a result many clinical psychology researchers 
develop models of disorders that are specific to their own clinical experience, 
researched in ways that often lack required levels of empirical rigour, and are built 
around esoteric constructs that do not match simply onto accepted and basic 
psychological operations related to perception, cognition and action, and in many 
cases may simply be redescriptions of the symptoms that it is often claimed they 
explain (Davey, 2003, 2013a). 
Second, it is often difficult for experimental psychopathologists developing 
psychological models to place their research in established clinical psychology and 
psychiatry journals – especially if their models have been developed on healthy 
individuals. Given that many relevant journals have a publication requirement that 
research must be carried out on clinical populations with a diagnostic label, this has 
not only made it more difficult for experimental psychopathology researchers to find 
suitable outlets for their research, it also means that such research may become 
scattered across a wider range of either secondary journals or mainstream psychology 
journals rather than being published in frontline clinical psychology or psychiatry 
journals. This is likely to give the erroneous impression that such research does not 
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belong to a body of research that represents a significant and alternative unified 
approach to understanding psychopathology1. 
Thirdly, those using experimental psychopathology methods to develop 
psychological models of psychiatric disorders have often been negligent in ensuring 
the validity of their research to clinical populations – especially if it is 
psychopathology-relevant research conducted on healthy individuals. Whilst external 
validity has been an important issue in other forms of experimental psychopathology 
(especially using animal models) (e.g. Belzung & Lemoine, 2011; Stewart & Kalueff, 
2015), it has only recently been discussed as a significant issue in the development of 
psychological models using healthy human participants (Vervliet & Raes, 2013). In 
the case of the experimental study of psychological models conducted on healthy 
individuals, lack of attention to external validity can seriously undermine the value of 
a piece of experimental psychopathology research. Researchers may need to indicate 
more clearly where the research fits into a putative research pathway from basic 
models developed on healthy individuals to researching processes that are proven to 
be unique to the relevant clinical population –a validation process that has been much 
more transparent and fully argued in the case of nonhuman animal models of 
psychopathology (cf. Vervliet & Raes, 2013) 
Given these background issues in the use of experimental psychopathology to 
develop psychological models of mental health problems, the main purpose of this 
article is to suggest a possible research pathway along which the development and 
application of such models can progress. This would have a number of benefits: it 
would (1) make explicit the need to address the external validity of developed models, 
                                                        
1 Recent changes in scope to Behaviour Research & Therapy and the launch of 
Journal of Experimental Psychopathology will improve the available outlets for 
experimental psychopathology research conducted on healthy individuals. 
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i.e. to provide a fuller set of arguments as to why experimental psychopathology 
studies can be generalized to clinical populations and diagnostic categories,  (2) 
provide a clear program of research that would be recommended when extending 
research on healthy individuals to diagnostic populations, and (3) recommend using 
general psychological knowledge when developing models of psychopathology. 
 
The External Validity of Psychological Models of Human Psychopathology 
 
When experimental psychopathologists have received a full and proper training in 
scientific and experimental methods there should be no need to question their 
empirical skills. What is at issue is the need to apply principles of external validity to 
that research to justify the relevance of the laboratory studies to the clinical 
populations to which those developed models are applied. This is not an issue that is 
specific to experimental psychopathologists developing psychological models of 
disorders, it is an issue that is highly relevant to all translational research. 
Understanding the different forms and types of external validity is a first step to 
developing a research pathway that will bridge the translational gap, so it is worth 
looking at some of the forms of external validity that have been postulated as relevant 
to translational research in general. 
 External validity criteria vary considerably in their strength and relevance. 
Table 1 provides a list of validity criteria that can be found in the broader 
experimental psychopathology literature (e.g. animal models of psychiatric disorders) 
and whose definitions are adapted to be relevant to the development of psychological 
models of psychopathology (adapted from Geyer & Markou, 1995; Stewart & 
Kalueff, 2015; Belzung & Lemoine, 2011; and Vervliet & Raes, 2013). 
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Face validity is the weakest of these criteria, but is usually the starting point 
for many researchers creating laboratory models of psychopathology. This criterion 
stresses there should be a formalistic or phenomenological similarity between the 
behaviour in the laboratory model and the symptoms in the disorder. Thus, a fear 
conditioning procedure conducted in the laboratory might have face validity as a 
model of specific phobias because the physiological measures of anxiety conditioned 
to the CS+ formalistically approximate to the fear elicited by phobic stimuli in phobic 
populations (e.g. Delgado, Olsson & Phelps, 2006; Lissek, Powers, McClure, Phelps, 
Woldehawariat, Grillon & Pine, 2005; Davey, 1992).  Other examples might include 
the use of mood induction procedures to generate anxious or depressed moods in 
healthy participants to examine how these moods might affect performance on a 
selection of disorder-relevant tasks (e.g. Davey, Bickerstaffe & MacDonald, 2006; 
Teasdale & Fogarty, 1979; Hepburn, Barnhofer & Williams, 2006; Grant, Stewart & 
Birch, 2007). Alternatively, some researchers have used healthy participants who 
score high on the relevant psychopathology (e.g. depression) but are at sub-clinical 
levels (e.g. Vredenburg, Flett & Krames, 1993). 
Predictive validity is the first step to demonstrating that your model and the 
processes defined within it do have some relevance to the clinical disorder. The 
requirement here is that your laboratory model predicts behaviour in the disorder. For 
example, manipulating appraisals of ‘inflated responsibility’ (the belief that one has 
power to bring about or prevent crucial negative outcomes) in healthy individuals 
may be found to have a direct effect on perseverative activities such as compulsive 
checking (Lopatka & Rachman, 1995; Bouchard, Rheame & Ladouceur, 1999), and 
so such a manipulation predicts behaviour found in certain forms of obsessive-
compulsive disorder. 
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What you do not know from simply applying a predictive validity criterion is 
whether the behaviour in your model and the behaviour in the disorder are generated 
by the same underlying mechanisms or processes. When adopting predictive validity 
you know that the outcome of your model matches the outcomes expected in the 
disorder, but you do not have evidence of whether the outcomes in the laboratory 
model and the clinical case are achieved via the same mechanisms. To establish 
whether the mechanisms of the laboratory model match the mechanisms operating in 
the clinical case requires a more stringent criterion and can be accomplished by 
applying criteria provided either by construct validity or aetiological validity. 
Construct validity requires that the laboratory model compares favourably with a 
clinical model of the disorder (and that this favourable comparison can be established 
at the level of at least some of the mechanisms within the laboratory model and the 
clinical model). This can be achieved in a number of ways. First, it should be possible 
to demonstrate that the various causal processes in your model can also be identified 
when those processes are examined in the relevant clinical population. For example, 
while a model of perseverative depressive rumination can be developed in the 
laboratory in healthy individuals (Hawksley & Davey, 2010), experimental studies 
can then be undertaken to identify whether the variables important in the model are 
generating depressive rumination in a clinical population (Chan, Davey & Brewin, 
2013). Secondly, the processes relevant to the laboratory model can also be identified 
in clinical populations through the collection and examination of patient aetiological 
case histories. For example, a laboratory conditioning model may demonstrate that 
fear or anxiety elicited by a stimulus (CS) can be generated by a combination of 
sensory preconditioning (the association of two innocuous but contiguous stimuli – 
e.g. a geometric shape presented on a computer screen followed by a nonaversive 
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60dB ‘beep’) and a subsequent process which inflates the aversiveness of the second 
of the two contiguous stimuli (the nominal UCS – such as increasing the loudness of 
the ‘beep’ to an aversive 100dB). This UCS inflation then has the effect of generating 
fear to the first of the associated stimuli (White & Davey, 1989). This process gives 
the impression that the fear-eliciting stimulus has never actually been contiguously 
paired with an aversive UCS. However, a search of relevant case histories in patients 
with anxiety disorders does provide many examples of where this two-process model 
has been active in the aetiology of their anxiety problems (Davey, de Jong & Tallis, 
1993), providing some good evidence for the construct validity of the laboratory 
conditioning model. Thirdly, if the laboratory model has already been constructed 
from an established aetiological model of the clinical disorder, then construct validity 
is a given. However, there are further theoretical advantages to the use of the 
laboratory model to test the clinical model. For instance, if the clinical model is based 
on principles derived from a broader, well-established theoretical approach, then the 
laboratory model can be used to explore the further implications of that theoretical 
approach for the disorder. One example is the use of conditioning theory to help 
explain the aetiology of disorders such as specific phobias and panic disorder (Davey, 
1997; Bouton, Mineka & Barlow, 2001), PTSD (Keane, Zimering & Caddell, 1985), 
and substance use disorders (O’Brien, Childress, Ehrman & Robbins, 1998), and to 
understand therapeutic processes such as the roles of inhibition and extinction during 
exposure therapy (Craske, Liao, Brown & Vervliet, 2012). The broad existing 
knowledge base around conditioning theory can then be used to test out new 
hypotheses about how associative or learning processes might be involved in the 
aetiology of the disorder (e.g. Davey, 1992), and thus enhance our understanding of 
the clinical model. Aetiological validity is a slightly stronger version of construct 
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validity in that it specifies that evidence should show that the laboratory and clinical 
models are identical. By it’s very definition, aetiological validity implies that the 
laboratory model is a faithful reconstruction of the clinical model, but this may be 
very difficult to achieve in practice, and perhaps can only be achieved in 
circumstances where the laboratory model has been built explicitly on knowledge of 
the clinical model. In contrast, construct validity merely implies that the laboratory 
model can be compared favourably with the clinical model (i.e. has at least some 
important similarities) and that the laboratory model may merely mimic the processes 
important in the clinical model. In many cases it may be sufficient to mimic the 
processes in the clinical model because of the difficulty in establishing exactly how 
causal processes work in the clinical model, and this is true of network models of 
brain processes involved in psychopathology when the details of the actual brain 
processes involved in the psychopathology are only poorly understood (e.g. Menon, 
2011). 
Convergent and Discriminant validity are criteria by which a researcher would 
attempt to demonstrate the degree to which their laboratory model is either similar to 
or different from other models of the disorder. Convergent validity will be helpful to a 
researcher when they are attempting to develop a new laboratory model of a disorder 
and showing that it predicts similar outcomes to more established and proven models. 
Discriminant validity is applicable when the researcher is attempting to test between 
laboratory models to demonstrate that one model has more validity than another. Both 
types of validity are important in each of these distinct roles. 
Finally, diagnostic validity is a criterion described by Vervliet & Raes (2013) 
as one of particular importance for experimental psychopathologists developing 
psychological models. Over and above showing that the laboratory model compares 
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favourably with the detail of the mechanisms underlying the clinical model (construct 
validity), diagnostic validity requires in addition that the researcher should be able to 
demonstrate that the laboratory model taps into processes or characteristics that are 
unique to the clinical population exhibiting the disorder. For example, if a researcher 
has developed their laboratory model of a disorder on a group of healthy participants, 
why is it that only a relative minority of the population acquires the disorder? One 
implication of this question is that the clinical population may possess characteristics 
that make them highly vulnerable to the critical variables and causal processes in the 
laboratory model, and diagnostic validity will be achieved when it can be 
demonstrated that there are unique features of the clinical population that do make 
them vulnerable to these important processes within the model. For example, 
laboratory models of ‘jumping to conclusions’ (the process of making a decision 
about the meaning or importance of an event on the basis of insufficient evidence) 
have been central to recent cognitive models of paranoia in psychosis (Savulich, 
Shergill & Yiend, 2012), but why doesn’t everyone ‘jump to conclusions’ and so 
consequently develop paranoia? The answer may lie in the fact that jumping to 
conclusions is significantly related to deficits in cognitive functions such as working 
memory, verbal memory and cognitive processing speed (Ochoa, Haro, Huerta-
Ramos, Cuevas-Esteban, Stephan-Otto, Usall, Nieto & Brebion, 2014), and these are 
deficits that are regularly found during, and even prior to, the onset of psychotic 
symptoms (Carrion, McLaughlin, Auther, Olsen, Correll & Cornblatt, 2015), and so 
will make those individuals vulnerable to the development of paranoia through the 
model’s important process of ‘jumping to conclusions’. Another example of 
diagnostic validity is one from our own lab. We have developed a laboratory model of 
perseverative worrying (a cardinal diagnostic characteristic of Generalized Anxiety 
 12 
Disorder) based on the mood-as-input model (Davey, 2006; Meeten & Davey, 2011). 
One feature of this model is that worriers use their concurrent mood to evaluate their 
progress at the worry task, and if they are in a negative mood (which is common in 
pathological worriers), that negativity informs them that they haven’t yet succeeded in 
dealing with the worry and so must continue worrying. Not everyone is a pathological 
worrier, so what is it about pathological worriers that makes them particularly 
vulnerable to the processes within this model of worry? The answer seems to be that 
they possess a number of characteristics that make them especially vulnerable to 
using their negative mood as information during a worry bout, and so are much more 
likely to perseverate when worrying in a negative mood (Meeten & Davey, 2011, 
pp1266-69). The fact that diagnostic validity makes the researcher think carefully 
about how their model relates to the unique characteristics of clinical populations 
adds another dimension to validating the model, and may even extend the model to 
providing psychological markers of vulnerability for psychopathology. 
 
A Research Pathway for Experimental Psychopathology 
 
It’s quite easy to see that the external validity criteria listed in the previous section 
begin with rather weak formalistic criteria and develop onwards to significantly 
stronger criteria that attempt to equate the laboratory model with the clinical 
phenomenon on a range of different levels. The important questions these criteria ask 
are sequentially: (1) Do the outcomes of your laboratory model superficially look like 
the clinical phenomenon? (2) Does your model predict what happens in the clinical 
phenomenon? (3) Can you show that the processes in your model closely resemble the 
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processes in the clinical phenomenon? And (4) does your model explain why the 
relevant clinical population is differentially vulnerable to the clinical disorder? 
 This sequence of criteria lends itself to the construction of a virtual research 
pathway for experimental psychopathology in which an initial basic laboratory model 
is developed in stages using a succession of empirical methodologies to answer the 
questions posed by each set of more rigorous validity criteria. This research pathway 
is illustrated in Table 2. 
 
Stage 1 – Proof of Concept:  This proof of concept stage is where the researcher 
constructs their model and demonstrates its feasibility and potential for use in 
explaining the clinical phenomenon. This process may involve the adaptation of core 
knowledge from other areas of psychology to help explain the clinical phenomenon 
(e.g. the use of existing knowledge of perception, memory, and decision-making 
processes to construct models explaining the attentional and interpretational biases 
that underlie anxious responding). But more commonly, this stage will involve the use 
of basic experiments under highly controlled conditions for the purpose of identifying 
causal relations between events. It is the identification of important causal relations 
using experimental procedures that is one of the defining features of experimental 
psychopathology, and the detection of causal relations is the very basis of effective 
theory building. However, experimental procedures are not just useful for detecting 
causal relations, they can also be used to infer the existence of processes that cannot 
be directly observed, directly manipulated or directly measured. Inferential 
methodologies have been a significant feature of experimental psychology over the 
years, and in particular were an important methodology in the development of 
cognitive models of animal learning where self-report methods are not an option 
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(Rescorla, 1980; Dickinson, 1980), and in the construction of models of human 
memory. Inferential techniques are a useful way of developing models of the 
cognitive processes that underlie clinical disorders, and some specific examples of 
how this type of methodology has been used to elucidate cognitive processes in 
psychopathology include (1) identifying some of the associative processes that 
underlie learned fear and anxiety (Davey, 1992; White & Davey, 1989; Davey & 
McKenna, 1989), (2) describing the detailed cognitive processes that contribute to 
attentional and interpretation biases in anxiety and mood disorders (Blanchette & 
Richards, 2010), and (3) clarifying the role of working memory in the efficacy of eye 
movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR) interventions (van den Hout & 
Engelhard, 2012). These are just three of many examples, but in each of these cases 
respectively, the associative processes, attentional processes, and role of working 
memory cannot be directly observed and had to be inferred from manipulations 
conducted in elegantly designed experiments. 
 
Stage 2 – Clinical Validity: At this stage the predictions of the model need to be 
tested against knowledge of what actually happens in the clinical phenomenon. 
Clinical participants can be tested experimentally to determine whether the important 
variables in the model are relevant in causing or maintaining the significant symptoms 
(e.g. Chan, Davey & Brewin, 2013). However, in at least some cases, this approach 
may be problematic because of the additional distress it may cause to already 
distressed individuals (e.g. subjecting these individuals to variables that may increase 
symptoms such as anxiety or depression). Alternative methods include examining 
case histories for evidence of the processes described by the model in the aetiology of 
clinical patients (e.g. Davey, de Jong & Tallis, 1993), or investigating the aetiologies 
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of clinical patients using self-report questionnaires and surveys (e.g. Öst & Hugdahl, 
1981; Merckelbach, Arntz & de Jong, 1991). 
 
Stage 3 – Diagnostic Validity: This stage represents the final link up between the 
psychological model developed in Stage 1 and the relevant clinical phenomenon. 
Because not everyone acquires a particular psychopathology, we need to ask what it is 
about the relevant clinical population that makes them differentially vulnerable to the 
disorder, and then clarify how the model explains this. Some progress towards this 
goal can be made using literature reviews and meta-analyses to demonstrate that the 
clinical population has characteristics that make them vulnerable to the important 
variables and processes in the model. But arguably more convincing evidence for 
diagnostic validity would come from experimental studies showing that members of 
the clinical population are significantly more reactive or sensitive to the model’s 
processes than healthy control participants. For example, the reasoning bias of 
‘jumping to conclusions’ is a critical variable in cognitive models of paranoid 
delusions, and as predicted by the model experimental tests show that a higher 
percentage of participants with paranoid delusions jump to conclusions compared to 
non-clinical control participants (Garety, Hemsley & Wessely, 1991; Fine, Gardner, 
Craigie & Gold, 2007; Savulich, Shergill & Yiend, 2012). This provides some 
validation for the cognitive model in that jumping to conclusions is a critical variable 
in the model that is significantly more prominent in the relevant clinical population. 
However, as argued below, it may not be necessary to make explicit comparisons 
between clinical populations and healthy individuals in this final stage – diagnostic 
validity might also be addressed in other ways. 
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 One example is by comparing healthy individuals with participants who score 
high on measures of the disorder but are at sub-clinical levels (e.g. Vredenburg, Flett 
& Krames, 1993). This approach is likely to be helpful and valid for disorders that are 
known to be dimensional rather than categorical in nature (Krueger & Piasecki, 
2002), and examples of disorders with known dimensional latent structures include 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder (Niles, Lebeau, Liao, Glenn & Craske, 2012), 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (Olatunji, Williams, Haslam, Abramowitz & Tolin, 
2007), and at least some psychotic experiences (Johns & van Os, 2001). The fact that 
the symptoms of some disorders appear to be dimensional rather than categorical may 
initially appear contradictory to establishing diagnostic validity by identifying 
characteristics that specifically define clinical populations and make them 
differentially vulnerable to the model being tested. But there is no reason to suppose 
that these differential vulnerability factors are not themselves dimensional.  The 
vulnerability factors themselves may be specific diagnostic identifiers (e.g. in the 
examples we have used so far, characteristics such as jumping to conclusions, 
potential to use mood as information, etc.), but once triggered may facilitate 
symptoms in a non-linear or exponential way.  
A second example is to test healthy individuals and to manipulate the critical 
variables in the model known to cause the disorder so that they approximate the levels 
of those characteristics in the clinical population. This is only possible, of course, if 
the researcher has prior knowledge that the clinical population possesses these 
characteristics, and an example will be provided in the next section. 
 You can see from this discussion that there is no one single method to 
conclusively demonstrate diagnostic validity, and it is likely to be a convergent 
process bringing together existing knowledge of the characteristics of the clinical 
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population, experimental studies comparing clinical and healthy populations, and 
even studies of the model’s critical variables conducted on healthy individuals. 
 
Some Implications of the Research Pathway:  Clearly, a research programme can 
be constructed across all three stages of the pathway, addressing each of the validity 
criteria in turn, but this is likely to be a lengthy and burdensome process and would 
seem appropriate only for the development of entirely new or novel psychological 
models. Alternatively, research can be conducted at any individual stage if the 
knowledge required by earlier stages is already available. For example, research can 
commence directly at Stage 2 if well-developed psychological models exist and 
convincingly address the validity questions posed at Stage 1. One clear example of 
this is when conditioning models are applied to psychopathology. The conditioning 
models have been well-developed elsewhere (e.g. in the animal learning literature), 
have a formalistic resemblance to the psychopathology (e.g. anxiety/fear learning), 
and so can be used to determine whether the processes defined by the model predict 
behaviour in the clinical disorder (e.g. Davey, 1989, 1992; Davey, de Jong & Tallis, 
1993). What is relatively unclear in this stage-based model is what would constitute 
sufficient evidence to be able to move confidently from one stage of the research 
pathway to the next. There may be no objective criteria by which to judge this, 
although the potential impact of the model on theory and/or practice may require 
more or less convincing validity evidence depending on the importance of the 
research questions being addressed. 
 It may also be the case that certain types of research could be prioritized at 
particular stages of the pathway. For example, it may be risky to start at Stage 1 by 
spending excessive time and funding on research that turns out not to be clinically 
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relevant. In contrast, the higher costs of intervention research may be better placed in 
the later stages of the pathway – especially if there is evidence that the intervention 
may already be viable, and to focus on diagnostic validity as a means of determining 
the effectiveness of the intervention in relation to the diagnostic characteristics of the 
relevant clinical population. 
 Models of psychopathology that postulate new mechanisms of aetiology may 
have to progress through all three stages of the pathway, beginning with proof of 
concept in Stage 1, through clinical validity in Stage 2, and ending with diagnostic 
validity in Stage 3. One interesting feature of this full pathway is that it would in 
principle be possible to answer validity questions at all three stages using studies 
conducted entirely on healthy individuals. It would require that certain relevant 
information about the pertinent clinical population was available in the literature, but 
studies conducted on healthy individuals could be sufficient to address all validity 
questions, including those posed by diagnostic validity. For example, it would be 
quite normal practice to construct the clinical model in Stage 1 on healthy participants 
to demonstrate its feasibility and potential for use in explaining the clinical 
phenomenon. Secondly, if information is available in the clinical literature about 
some of the basic processes through which clinical populations develop their disorder 
(e.g. that some specific phobias are acquired by contiguous experiences with aversive 
events), the predictive validity of the model could be tested on healthy individuals by 
seeing if the model produces outcomes that are consistent with aetiological 
knowledge in the clinical literature (e.g. White & Davey, 1989; Alvarez, Biggs, Chen, 
Pine & Grillon, 2008; Davey & Matchett, 1994). At Stage 3, the model should be in a 
well-developed state that enables the researcher to identify the significant variables 
that generate the disorder via the model. If these variables represent known 
 19 
characteristics of the clinical population, then the researcher may be able to 
manipulate these variables in healthy participants and predict outcomes representative 
of the disorder (providing some evidence for diagnostic validity). For example, the 
mood-as-input hypothesis of perseverative worrying argues that pathological worriers 
use their negative mood as information that they have not achieved the goals of their 
worry and so persevere with their worrying  (Meeten & Davey, 2011). But not 
everyone in a negative mood perseveres when worrying, so what makes pathological 
worriers different? A search of the social psychology literature on mood reveals that 
when people are engaged in a task (such as worrying) they will only use their moods 
as information under certain conditions (e.g. when they lack expertise in the task, only 
when they know their mood is relevant to the task in some way, or when they are 
experiencing high cognitive load) (Schwarz & Clore, 1983; Ottati & Isbell, 1996; 
Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998). Interestingly, all these factors are active in individuals 
identified as pathological worriers. Pathological worriers have poor problem-solving 
confidence, and so lack confidence in their expertise to deal with the worry problem 
(Davey, 1994; Laugesen & Dugas, 2000), are actively attempting to repair negative 
mood, and so their mood is very relevant to the task (Clark & Isen, 1982), and anxiety 
is known to increase cognitive load and reduce working memory capacity, and thus be 
more likely to render mood relevant as information (Hayes, Hirsch & Mathews, 2008; 
Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). Given this knowledge of the relevant clinical population, 
the experimental psychopathology researcher can now test the diagnostic validity of 
the mood-as-input model by experimentally manipulating these factors in healthy 
individuals to simulate conditions that are characteristic of the clinical population. 
 Conducting experimental psychopathology research fastidiously via this three-
stage virtual programme of research will be a lengthy process. But research at each 
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level is valid in its own right. A consequence of this is that journal editors and funding 
bodies should not be asking researchers at Stage 1 to provide concrete evidence that 
their research or model is relevant to a clinical population. They also should not be 
insisting that the research is only clinically valid if it is done on clinical populations. 
Indeed, as I’ve argued above, it is entirely possible for all three stages of the research 
to be conducted on healthy individuals and still be perfectly clinically relevant and 
clinically valid if linked to the relevant clinical literature. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Over the past decade there have been many challenges facing the experimental 
psychopathologist studying psychological models of clinical disorders. These have 
ranged from clinical research on healthy participants being excluded from clinical 
journals, to intensive competition for funds with popular alternative explanatory 
approaches such as neuroscience and genetics (Davey, 2015). One way in which 
experimental psychopathology can begin to compete with these alternative 
approaches is to be very clear about what constitutes valid experimental 
psychopathology research and the pathway by which such research needs to progress 
and be validated. This paper outlines a putative pathway for experimental 
psychopathology research developing psychological models of clinical disorders, and 
will hopefully encourage researchers to specify in the introduction to their papers the 
research framework in which their models have been developed and the validation 
processes they have adopted to justify their models. This will communicate to the 
broader clinical research community that psychological models derived from 
experimental psychopathology methodologies are a valid and coherent contribution to 
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understanding and treating mental health problems, and provide a valuable alternative 
perspective to neuroscience and genetic approaches.  
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Table 1: A list of validity criteria taken from the broader experimental 
psychopathology literature and adapted to the development of psychological 
models of psychopathology. 
 
 
Validity Criterion 
 
 
Definition 
 
Face Validity 
 
 
The phenomenological similarity between the 
behaviour in the laboratory model and the 
symptoms of the disorder 
 
 
Predictive Validity 
 
 
Performance in the laboratory model predicts 
performance in the disorder 
 
 
Construct Validity 
 
 
The model developed in the laboratory can be 
compared favourably with existing clinical 
models of the disorder. The processes 
described in the laboratory model parallel the 
clinical processes of interest. 
 
 
Aetiological Validity 
 
 
It can be shown that the aetiologies in the 
laboratory model and the disorder are identical. 
 
 
Convergent Validity 
 
 
The degree to which outcomes from the 
laboratory model correlate with 
measures/outcomes from other models of the 
same disorder/construct 
 
 
Discriminant Validity 
 
 
A model differs from other models of the same 
disorder to the extent that it’s outcomes are 
different to those predicted by other models 
 
 
Diagnostic Validity 
 
 
Demonstrating that the laboratory model taps 
into processes that are unique to the clinical 
population exhibiting the disorder 
 
 
Definitions adapted from Geyer & Markou (1995), Stewart & Kalueff (2015), 
Belzung & Lemoine (2011), and Vervliet & Raes (2013). 
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Table 2: A putative three-stage research pathway for experimental psychopathology (see text for further elaboration). 
 
 Stages/Validity Criteria 
 Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 
 
 
 
Proof of Concept 
 
 
Clinical Validity 
 
Diagnostic Validity 
 
Validity 
Questions 
 
 
“Does your model produce measurable 
behavioural/physiological/cognitive outcomes that resemble the 
clinical phenomenon?” 
 
 
“Does your model predict what happens in the 
clinical phenomenon?” 
 
“Can you show that the processes in your model 
closely resemble the processes in the clinical 
phenomenon?” 
 
Does your model explain why the relevant clinical population is 
differentially vulnerable to the clinical disorder?” 
 
Purpose 
 
 
 To establish models of psychopathology with 
formalistic similarity to their corresponding disorder 
 Proof of Concept Studies 
 Developing laboratory models of psychopathology 
symptoms (e.g. for testing intervention efficacy) 
 Adaptations of core psychological knowledge to mimic 
psychopathology processes 
 
 To establish that your laboratory 
model predicts behaviour in the 
disorder 
 To apply a well-developed pre-existing 
theoretical model to a disorder to 
expand an understanding of the 
disorder 
 
 To demonstrate that your laboratory model taps 
into processes that are unique to the relevant 
clinical population 
 To establish why the relevant clinical population is 
vulnerable to the processes in your model (and 
which give rise to the disorder) 
 
Methodology 
 
 
 Experiments that provide evidence of causal relations 
between events that allow theory building 
 Inferential experimental studies used to develop 
laboratory models 
 
 
 Experimental studies demonstrating 
that novel predictions from the 
model/theory apply to the disorder 
 Case histories – demonstrating that 
processes specified in the model can 
be identified in the aetiology of clinical 
cases 
 
 Literature & systematic reviews 
 Meta-analyses of studies exploring processes 
relevant to your model 
 Experimental studies generating characteristics 
typical of the clinical population in healthy 
participants (to test the relevance of these 
characteristics to symptom generation) 
Participant 
Type 
 
 Mainly healthy participants 
 
 Healthy participants or clinical 
populations 
 
 Clinical populations or healthy participants 
 
